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Abstract
It is well known that under di¤erentiated product monopolistic competition any
merger always increases the total pro…t of the merged entity. Because of this one might
expect complete monopolization of a price competing industry provided that there are
no (legal) barriers to acquisition (merger). In this paper we show that this is not
always true. Theindustry may not get monopolized because thevalueofa fringe …rm is
getting higher when theconcentration oftheindustry getshigher. This createsstrategic
incentives for a fringe …rm to be last in the line of those who sell their businesses.
Sometimes this type of incentive prevents industry monopolization.
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11 Introduction
The problem of industry monopolization is one ofcentral questions inIndustrial Organization.
Farrell and Shapiro (1990), Gaudet and Salant (1992), Kamien and Zang (1990), Salant,
Switzer and Reynolds (1983) studied quantity competing industries. They showed that in an
industry composed of more than two …rms, under a gradual merging process when at a time
only two…rms merge, initial acquisitions are not pro…table when…rms compete on quantities.1
This may prevent industry monopolization in spite of the fact that the …nal outcome of the
merging process bene…ts all parties – the monopoly collects highest possible pro…ts in the
industry, because the monopoly always has the option of mimicking the nonmonopolized
market with any degree of industry concentration. Other papers such as Gowrisankaran and
Holmes (2001), Lewis (1983), Krishna (1993), and Perry and Porter (1983) derived a similar
result for price competing industries with shortage of capital or production capacities.
This paper contributes to the theory of industry concentration under monopolistic compe-
tition with a di¤erentiated product in the presence of a single leading or expanding …rm. To
the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence of having the non-monopolization outcome in
an industry where the expanding …rm is allowed to make a sequence of o¤ers for other …rms
businesses in order to gain more control over the market. It is known that (see Deneckere
and Davidson (1983, 1985) for details) in a price competing industry if any two …rms have
decided to get united into a joint venture2, they start collecting more pro…ts than before, this
being valid for an arbitrary number of …rms in the market.3 The same may be true for the
quantity or Cournot competing industries provided that …rms enjoy economies of scale from
merger (e.g., see Kamien and Zang (1991)). Thus our analysis may be naturally extended to
1All these papers assume speci…cations of linear demand and constant marginal cost. In particular, Salant
et al. (1983) showed that all mergers with market share lower than 80% are unpro…table. For other forms of
demand this share takes lower values: 50% as in Cheung (1992), or even lower as in Levin (1990), Fauli-Oller
(1997), and Hennessy (2000).
2It does not matter whether this happens by merger or acquizition.
3In economic theory this feature of pro…ts is named superadditivity.
2these situations. Hence, it may appear that by granting the right to one leading …rm to buy
any other …rm’s business, the industry will eventually become monopolized.
The main idea of this paper is to show that the acquisition process described above does
not always lead to a one-…rm industry. This happens for the following reason: the more
industry is concentrated the higher pro…ts are not only of the merged …rm but all of other
…rms. Hence, if some …rm is about to be o¤ered to sell its business to an expanding …rm,
and it predicts that the concentration of industry will continue, this …rm has an incentive to
decline the o¤er and try to be the last in line of those who sells its business or demands more
than its net current pro…t. This observation was also made by Stigler (1950); the following
passage on pages 25 and 26 supports the same point.
”If there are relatively few…rms in the industry, the major di¢culty in forming
a merger is that it is more pro…table to be outside a merger than to be a partici-
pant. ... Hence the promoter of a merger is likely to receive much encouragement
from each …rm - almost every encouragement, in fact, except participation.”
Clearly, how much each …rm gets paid depends on the negotiation process. We show
that under certain negotiation patterns the amount the expanding …rm needs to pay for the
full industry capture may exceed extra pro…ts. This happens in spite of the fact that the full
monopolizationgives the highest possiblepro…ts in industry. Also, it is shown that this kindof
strategic behavior may stop acquisition at some point (so that the industry remains partially
monopolized), or even may preclude any acquisitions. In addition, it is demonstrated that
under certain circumstances the …rm’s acquisition does not give any net additional pro…ts to
the leading …rm after full monopolization of the industry. All extra pro…ts go to the other
…rms in form of payments for their businesses.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we reconcile the classical model of monop-
olistic competition with di¤erentiated products. The …rms are symmetric in terms of demand
for their product. The only di¤erence is that only one …rm which we call an expanding or
3leading …rm has the right to buy the businesses of other …rms, which are called fringe.4 Then
the case of two fringe …rms is considered in detail. This is the smallest number when the
strategic issue of order of acquisition takes place. For this framework we normalize all pro…ts
and construct a benchmark model for a game theoretical investigation. At the end of Sec-
tion 2 we describe inputs acquisition problem, a special case of the benchmark model where
strategic issues of being last in business selling are absent5. This model is contrasted with a
general one for better understanding of the role of strategic issues of fringe …rms. In the rest
of the paper we construct games in order to analyze a wide set of bargaining processes. For
any degree of bargaining power of the leading …rm there are subgame perfect equilibria where
some fringe …rms sell their businesses at a price which is higher than the pro…ts they collect.
Moreover, at some equilibria the industry stays non-monopolized. This is demonstrated in
Section 3 for shot horizon situations and in Section 4 for dynamic settings. Section 5 provides
some further insight for an industry of more than two fringe …rms. The paper results are
summarized and future directions of research are discussed in the concluding section.
2 Benchmark model: industry with one expanding …rm
and two fringe …rms
In this section we consider a price competing industry with three …rms (one expanding and
two fringe …rms), and describe equilibrium situations under various ownership structures. In
the second part of this section we formalize the acquisition game with normalized pro…ts, the
benchmark model. In the third part we discuss the special case of the benchmark model when
strategic issues for fringe …rms are absent, or fringe …rm pro…ts do not depend on industry
concentration. Modelling in this section is adapted from Deneckere and Davidson (1985) to
a large degree.
4See Gilbert and Newbery (1982) for the sources which make a …rm expanding.
5Because there is no futher increase in pro…ts of a fringe …rm from industry concentration.
42.1 Equilibria with di¤erent ownership structure
Consider an industry with di¤erentiated products. There are 3 …rms, one expanding, or
leading, …rm, and two fringe …rms. We index the leading …rm by 0 and fringe …rms by 1 and
2. Each …rm has a license for production and selling of only one brand of product. Each
brand is indexed according to the index of the …rm producing it.
The demand for brand i (i = 0;1;2) depends on its price pi and average price for other
brands ¹ p¡i =
P
j6=ipj
2 .6 To avoid excessive mathematics we consider the linear demand speci-
…cation for brand i in the following form7:
D(pi; ¹ p¡i) = 1¡ pi ¡ ° (pi ¡ ¹ p¡i); (1)
where Di(:;:) denotes the demand for brand i; and the parameter ° 2 (¡1;+1) re‡ects the
degree of substitutability of brands, the larger ° the more homogeneous products are. Notice
that ° = 0 corresponds to the local monopoly situation, and ° = +1 corresponds to the
homogeneous product competition. Negative values of ° correspond to complement products.
Also, let us point out that only values of ° larger than ¡1 yield a downward sloping demand
function. Other values of ° allow for collection of unlimited revenue. To demonstrate the





In order to avoid the issues of economy of scale it is assumed that …rms have zero costs of
6It is assumed that a brand ownership has no e¤ect on its demand.
7This functional form is quite common in the literature, e.g. Deneckere and Davidson (1985) and Shubik
(1980). Also note that the certain rescaling is made, hence, in fact, we analyze a more general linear demand
speci…cation. Also note that in the rest of the paper we use certain dependence of pro…t collected for each
brand on the industry structure. Deneckere and Davidson (1983) showed that the same comparative results
take place for a more general demand structure. Hence the conclusions of the paper are valid for a wider class
of demand functions.
8As will be seen later, the strategic incentives of fringe …rms are stronger for complements rather than for
substitutes. In the two fringe …rms case this implies that non-monopolization happens only for complement
products. But when the number of fringe …rms gets larger we get the same result for substitute products.
5production9. The leading…rm is allowedto acquire alicensefor any fringe…rm brand provided
that the fringe …rm agrees to the terms of o¤er made by the expanding …rm. Sometimes we
will simply call this process the acquisition of a …rm.
There are three qualitatively di¤erent industry ownership structures, each of which corre-
sponds to the number of acquired fringe …rms brands. Let us denote this number by s. Two
brands being acquired implies full monopolization. Let us analyze each situaion in detail.
No fringe …rm is acquired, s = 0. According to equation (1) the best response pricing
for brand i to the average price for other brands ¹ p¡i is




When ° ¸ ¡1=2; there is a unique symmetric equilibrium with equal prices and pro…ts








(2+ °)2 (i = 0;1;2); (3)
where the superscript indicates the number of brands captured by the expanding …rm, and
the subscript indexes the brand.
Notice that the equilibrium price and pro…t are monotonically decreasing with the degree
of products substitutability °; and converge to the case of Bertrand competition as ° tends
to +1.
One fringe …rm is acquired, s = 1. Due to the symmetry across the fringe …rms it
su¢ces to consider the situation when only brand 1 is captured by the leading …rm. Clearly,
the best response pricing for brand 2 is described by (2) while the optimal pricing for brands
0 and 1 no longer corresponds to formula (2) due to mutual spillover e¤ects. Taking into
9Linear transformation of prices makes the situation of constant maginal costs equivalent to the zero
marginal cost case.
10The pro…ts collected from each brand give su¢cient information for calculations of pro…t of any of the
…rms.












8+ 12° + 3°2; (4)
^ ¦1
0(°) = ^ ¦1
1(°) =
(4 +5°)(8+ 14° + 5°2)
2(8+ 12° +3°2)
2 ; ^ ¦1
2(°) =
16(1+ °)(1+ 2° + °2)
(8 +12° + 3°2)
2 :
As it is shown by Deneckere and Davidson (1985) for ° > 0; the acquisition leads to a
price increase for all brands as well as to an increase in pro…ts collected from all brands. The
pro…t for the non-acquired brand ^ ¦1
2(°) is the highest, while the price is the lowest for positive
values of °; and the highest for negative values of °.
Two fringe …rms are acquired, s = 2. In this case the expanding …rm enjoys full
monopoly power and sets the monopoly pricing in order to get highest possible pro…ts from









(i = 0;1;2): (5)
Compared to the previous case (s = 1) the prices are strictly higher for positive values of
° and strictly lower for negative values of °. The pro…ts are higher for brands 0 and 1 when
° is nonzero. As for brand 2 the pro…t is higher for positive °; and lower for negative °.
Having obtained the equilibrium pro…ts under di¤erent speci…ed ownership structures we
state major results of this section in the following two Lemmas.11 12




2(°) (s = 0;1;2) as the total industry pro…t. The function ^ ¦s(°) is strictly increasing
in s for nonzero values of ° 2 [¡1=2;+1).
11More general result is obtained by Deneckere and Davidson (1985).
12For both lemmas, …rst, we need to show that pro…ts ^ ¦0
i(°)’s and ^ ¦1
i(°)’s are well de…ned for ° 2
[¡1=2;+1). Indeed in (3) the denominator takes positive value. As for ^ ¦1
i(°)’s they are not spec…ed if
the expression in (4) '3(°) = 8+12° +3°2 takes zero values. This is not possible because '3(°) is a parabola
with minimum value at ¡2 < ¡1=2 and '3(¡1=2) = 11=4.
7ii) For nonzero values of ° 2 [¡1=2;+1) the pro…t of the leading …rm when only one
brand i is acquired is strictly higher than the sum of pro…ts collected from brands 0 and i
before acquisition, i.e. ^ ¦1
0(°)+ ^ ¦1
i(°) > ^ ¦0
0(°) + ^ ¦0
i(°).
PROOF: Part (i). From (3-5) we get the following expressions for ^ ¦s(°) for di¤erent levels




(2+ °)2; ^ ¦
1(°) =
48+ 144° + 138°2 + 41°3
(8+ 12° + 3°2)





The increment of the total pro…t when only one fringe …rm is acquired is
^ ¦1(°) ¡ ^ ¦0(°) =
°2(24+ 68° +59°2 + 14°3)
(8 +12° +3°2)
2(2 +°)2 :
For positive values of° the above expressionis positive. Fornegativevalues of ° the expression
is negative if and only if the value ofthe polynomial '1(°) = 24+68°+59°2+14°3 is negative.
By di¤erentiating and checking for roots of the derivative we obtain that '1(°) is increasing
on the interval (¡17=21;+1). Because '1(¡17=21) = 251=1323 and ¡17=21 < ¡1=2; we
have ^ ¦1(°) ¡ ^ ¦0(°) > 0 for ° 2 [¡1=2;+1).
The change of the industry structure from acquiry of one …rm to full monopolization gives
the following increase of the industry pro…ts:
^ ¦
2(°) ¡ ^ ¦
1(°) =
°2(24+ 52° + 27°2)
4(8+ 12° + 3°2)
2 :
This expression may be negative only if the polynomial '2(°) = 24 + 52° + 27°2 can take
negative values. The function '2(°) is a parabola whose minimum is at ¡26=27 < ¡1=2.
Because '2(¡1=2) = 19=4; we get ^ ¦2(°) ¡ ^ ¦1(°) > 0 for ° 2 [¡1=2;+1).










°2(8 +28° + 28°2 +7°3)
(8+ 12° + 3°2)
2(2+ °)2
This expression may be negative only if the polynomial '3(°) = 8+28°+28°2+ 7°3 can take
negative values. The derivative of '3(°) takes positive values for ° > ¡2=3; and '2(¡1=2) =
1=8. Q.E.D.
8Lemma 2 (Monotonicity of Fringe Firm Pro…t) Suppose that fringe …rm 2 is not acquired.
Then its pro…t ^ ¦s




2(°) ¡ ^ ¦
0
2(°) =
°2(1+ °)(16+ 24° +7°2)
(2 +°)2(8 +12° +3°2)
2 .
This expression takes negative values if and only if the polynomial '(°) = 16 + 24° + 7°2 is
negative. But '(°) describes a parabola with the minimum value reached at ° = ¡12=7 <
¡1=2; and '(¡1=2) = 23=4. Q.E.D.
2.2 Preliminary discussion and the benchmark model
Lemma 1 states a well-known supermodularity property of the pro…t function in a price
competing industry. From the …rst sight this seems to be undoubtedly su¢cient to bring
an unregulated industry to a full control by the expanding …rm. Yet, from Lemma 2 it
follows that a fringe …rm which sells its business …rst of the two, and which expects complete
monopolization of the industry, should raise the asking price for its brand from ^ ¦0
2(°) to the
higher price ^ ¦1
2(°). Hence it is possible that due to a strategic behavior of fringe …rms the
expanding…rm has topay to the fringe …rms2^ ¦1
2(°) insteadoftheloweramount ^ ¦0
1(°)+^ ¦1
2(°).
The following Lemma shows that it is possible that 2^ ¦1
2(°) is larger than pro…t gains of the
expanding …rm ^ ¦2(°)¡ ^ ¦0
0(°) from the full industry monopolization. In the same Lemma we
will alsoshowa weaker resultrequiredbelow: thereare valuesof° for whichmaximumpossible
values for brands 2^ ¦1
2(°) plus extra pro…ts of theleading …rm given that onebrandis acquired,
(^ ¦1
0(°) ¡ ^ ¦0
0(°)) + (^ ¦1
1(°) ¡ ^ ¦0
1(°)); is higher than additional pro…ts after monopolization,
^ ¦2(°) ¡ ^ ¦0
0(°). Using the equality of pro…ts for all brands when s = 0 the above statement
can be written as 2^ ¦1
2(°)+ ^ ¦1
0(°)+ ^ ¦1
1(°) > ^ ¦2(°)+ ^ ¦0
0(°). Again, from expressions (3-5) we
have
9Lemma 3 9¹ ° 2 (¡1=2;0) such that for all ° 2 [¡1=2; ¹ °) we have (i) 2^ ¦1
2(°) > ^ ¦2(°)¡^ ¦0
0(°);
and (ii) 2^ ¦1
2(°) + ^ ¦1
0(°) + ^ ¦1
1(°) > ^ ¦2(°) + ^ ¦0
0(°).
PROOF: Since the second inequality follows from the …rst we need to show Part (i).
Consider the function














which is continuous unless the denominator is zero. The statement of the Lemma results
because '1(¡1=2) = 5=4356 > 0. Q.E.D.
Now we construct a benchmark model which is a major building block for the rest of the
analysis. First, the pro…ts without any acquisition can be considered as …rms’ reservation
values, so we can safely put them to zero. Second, we measure pro…ts in terms of ^ ¦2(°) ¡
^ ¦0(°), an increase in the industry pro…ts from the full monopolization case. Given that
normalization, i) if there are no acquisitions, then all …rms make zero payo¤s (extra pro…ts),
ii) if there is full monopolization, then the monopolist gets a unit of extra pro…ts, iii) if there








^ ¦2(°) ¡ ^ ¦0(°)
and b(°) =
^ ¦1
2(°) ¡ ^ ¦0
2(°)
^ ¦2(°) ¡ ^ ¦0(°)
:
By substituting in the brands pro…t values from equations (3-5) we get closed form ex-
pressions for a(°) and b(°). When the speci…cation of demand is given by (1), they have the
following forms:
a(°) =
4(8+ 28° + 28°2 + 7°3)
3(8+ 12° + 3°2)2 and b(°) =
4(1+ °)(16 +24° +7°2)
3(8 +12° + 3°2)2 : (6)
Figure 1 presents the graphs of a(°) and b(°).
13Note that a(°) and b(°) are not well de…ned when ° is zero. This happens because pro…ts collected from
each brand do not depend on the industry structure. Because only nonzero values of ° are considered, this is
immaterial for our analysis.
10Figure 1: Functions a(°) and b(°).
As a direct corollary of above Lemmas the following properties of a(°) and b(°) can be
obtained.
Lemma 4 For nonzero values of ° 2 [¡1=2;+1); (i) The values a(°) and b(°) are positive,
(ii) a(°)+b(°) < 1; and (iii) a(°) < b(°). Moreover, (iv) 9¹ ° 2 (¡1=2;0) such that b(°) > 1
2;
and hence a(°)+ 2b(°) > 1 for ° 2 [¡1=2; ¹ °).14
PROOF: Part (i). For a(°) the statement of the Lemma follows from part (ii) of Lemma
1, and for b(°) it follows from Lemma 2.
14The location of ¹ ° is shown on Figure 1.
11Part (ii) follows from part (i) of Lemma 1.
Part (iii). Consider the following di¤erence:




which is strictly positive for ° 2 [¡1=2;+1) because the parabola g(°) = 8+12°+3°2 takes
minimum value at ° = ¡2; and g(¡1=2) = 11=4.
Part (iv) follows from Lemma 3 and the following:
b(°) =
^ ¦1
2(°) ¡ ^ ¦0
2(°)





2(°) ¡ 2^ ¦0
2(°)




^ ¦2(°)¡ ^ ¦0
0(°) ¡ 2^ ¦0
2(°)










2(°) ¡ 4^ ¦0
0(°)
^ ¦2(°) ¡ ^ ¦0(°)
>
^ ¦2(°) + ^ ¦0
0(°) ¡ 4^ ¦0
0(°)
^ ¦2(°) ¡ ^ ¦0(°)
= 1,
where the …rst inequality follows from part (i) of Lemma 3, and the second follows from part
(ii). Q.E.D.
In order to avoid extra notation sometimes we will just use a and b instead of a(°) and
b(°) in the rest of the paper. Also we assume that ° is nonzero in order to deal with positive
values of a and b.
2.3 Inputs acquisition problem as special case of benchmark model
In this section we present a special case of our model where there are no strategic incentives
for fringe …rms. Suppose there are three …rms, one expanding and two fringe ones. Each
fringe …rm has one unit of an irreplaceable input. Both inputs are needed for the leading …rm
to implement a project which results in one unit of pro…t. The value of any input is zero
for either fringe …rm. Unlike in our benchmark model, possession of only one input by the
leading …rm has no e¤ect on any …rm’s pro…t. This situation is a special case of the main
model when values of a and b are zero. We use this model in parallel to the main one to
better understand how it is important to have an increase in the pro…t of a fringe …rm while
the industry gets more concentrated.
123 Short horizon models
Now let us investigate the problem of acquisition of fringe …rms. The simplest modelling is
that in the form of short horizon games. First we will construct a baseline acquisition game.
As it will beshownthe Nashequilibria ofthis game have thefollowing features: if the industry
gets monopolizedeach …rm gets paidthevalueb for its business (fringe …rm’s extra pro…t when
it stays an only competitor of the leading …rm). Also, it is possible to have one fringe …rm
non-captured when the extra pro…t for the expanding …rm from full monopolization (1 ¡ a)
does not cover the payments for both fringe …rms 2b. In this case the acquired …rm gets zero
extra payment for its business15. In the rest of the section the robustness of conclusions based
on the baseline model will be checked by considering its various modi…cations.
In this paper the subgame perfection concept is applied to Nash equilibria in pure strate-
gies.16 Whenever it is necessary, to better understand the model, subgame perfect equilibria
in mixed strategies are analyzed. From time to time, for brevity we call a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium simply an equilibrium.
3.1 A short horizon model with non monopolization
To obtain the situation when the industry does not get monopolized let us consider the
following three stage short horizon game which we call
Game ¡1 (Main game):
Stage 1: The expanding …rm makes simultaneous o¤ers (z1;z2) to fringe …rms 1 and 2,
which it is ready to pay for their businesses.
15Remember that a zero extra payment means that the fringe …rm just gets compensated for pro…t that
would be collected if it stays in business.
16One may wonder why subgame perfect equilibria in mixed strategies are not analysed. We do not do this
for the following reasons. First, all games considered have at least one equilibrium in pure strategies. Second,
the main purpose of the paper is to demonstrate a possibility of non-monopolization. Third, an analysis of
mixed strategies is quite tedious and, as a matter of fact, does not a¤ect the main result of the paper.
13Stage 2: Each fringe …rm observes all o¤ers and simultaneously with the other fringe …rm
accepts fAg or rejects fRg the corresponding o¤er.
Stage 3: Price competition by …rms in business (the expanding …rm and fringe …rm(s)
who rejected the o¤er) takes place, and …rms in business receive pro…ts expressed in (3-5).
Generically, this game has a unique subgame perfect pro…t pro…le in pure strategies. The
following Lemma formalizes this result.17
Lemma 5 The game ¡1 has the following outcome pro…le as subgame perfect equilibria: If
2b+a < 1 both …rms get captured at price b for each. In the opposite case 2b+a > 1 only one
…rm gets acquired at a zero price. When 2b+a = 1; either of the above outcomes is possible.18
PROOF: To …nd subgame perfect Nash equilibria we use the backward induction method.
At stage 3 there is a unique outcome given by (3-5). Any subgame at stage 2 is characterized
by o¤ers (z1;z2) of the leading …rm to fringe …rms 1 and 2; correspondingly. The subgame
perfection re…nement principle requires that given these o¤ers (z1;z2) the fringe …rms play
the Nash equilibrium. The corresponding subgame where each fringe …rm has two strategies
fA;Rg is shown on Figure 2. We call this subgame as ~ ¡1(z1;z2). Let us point out that
for any pair of nonnegative z1 and z2 the subgame ~ ¡1(z1;z2) has at least one equilibrium in
pure strategies, which makes it appropriate to work with subgame perfect equilibria in pure
strategies.
Next, we calculate the minimum possible payo¤ of the leading …rm. It should be as high
as 1¡2b. Indeed, let it be, on the contrary, 1¡2b¡4", where " > 0, then the expanding …rm
is able to o¤er (z1;z2) = (b +";b+ "). For these o¤ers the subgame ~ ¡1(b+ ";b+ ") has only
one equilibrium fA;Ag and at this equilibrium the expanding …rm obtains 1¡2b¡2". On the
17Recall that 1 unit of pro…t corresponds to a di¤erence between pro…t in the monopolized industry and
pro…ts from all brands when no fringe …rm is captured. a stands for extra pro…ts of the merged entity when
one brand is acquired, and b stands for for additional pro…t of the non-captured fringe …rm.
18It can be checked that 2b(°) + a(°) = 1 at ° ' ¡:4509. Lower values of ° correspond to the situation of
acquisition of one …rm.
14Figure 2: Normal form of subgame ~ ¡1(z1;z2) of game ¡1 at stage 2.
other hand, the subgame payo¤ to the leading …rm should be no less than a. Indeed, for any
equilibrium with the payo¤ of a ¡ 2"; " > 0 …rm 0 may o¤er (z1;z2) = (";"). The subgame
~ ¡1(";") has only two equilibria fA;Rg and fR;Ag. Either of these equilibria yields a ¡ " to
the expanding …rm. Hence, at any subgame perfect equilibrium the leading …rm receives no
less than Z = maxf1¡ 2b;ag.
Now let us show that Z is an upper bound for the payo¤ of …rm 0. There are three
fundamentally di¤erent equilibrium situations which di¤er by the number of captured fringe
…rms s = 0;1;2. Let us calculate the highest possible payo¤ U(s) for each value of s. When
no fringe …rm is captured (s = 0), clearly, the leading …rm receives no extra pro…ts U(0) = 0.
Inthe case of one captured fringe …rm (s = 1), the acquired …rm should receive a non-negative
payo¤, hence U(1) = a. Finally, when two fringe …rms are acquired, each of them should be
paid at least b, otherwise a fringe …rm has a pro…table deviation of rejecting the o¤er. This
implies that U(2) = 1 ¡ 2b. All this means that the leading …rm cannot get more than the
payo¤ of maxs U(s) = maxf1¡2b;ag. Hence, at any equilibrium the expanding …rm receives
maxf1 ¡ 2b;ag. Depending on which value under the max function is higher we have two
situations. Let us analyze them separately.
Case 1 ¡ 2b > a or 2b+ a < 1: From the previous analysis we know that the equilibrium
payo¤ of …rm 0 is 1¡2b; and in this equilibrium both fringe …rms must be captured at o¤ers
15(z1;z2) = (b;b). Indeed, the subgame ~ ¡1(b;b) has the equilibrium fA;Ag. One can check
that at any subgame ~ ¡1(z1;z2) there is no equilibrium that yields to …rm 0 a payo¤ which is
strictly higher than 1¡ 2b. This proves the …rst statement of the Lemma.
Case 1 ¡ 2b < a or 2b + a > 1: Here in the equilibrium the leading …rm must capture
only one fringe …rm at a zero price. The subgame ~ ¡1(0;0) has the equilibrium fA;Rg with
the payo¤ of a to the expanding …rm, and, as we already know, no subgame ~ ¡1(z1;z2) has an
equilibrium that provides a strictly higher payo¤ to …rm 0. This yields the second statement
of the Lemma.
One can check that in the boundary case 1¡2b = a the equilibria constructed for the two
situations with strict inequalities coexist together. Q.E.D.
One may wonder what happens if the fringe …rms are allowed to play mixed strategies at
stage 2 of the game ¡1. The lemma in the appendix describes this indetail. This lemma shows
that if 1¡2b ¸ a then there emerges no equilibrium payo¤ pro…les beyond those described in
Lemma 5, whereas if 1¡ 2b < a then there is a set of new payo¤ pro…les. At these equilibria
the expected payo¤ of the expanding …rm is strictly smaller than a. At any equilibrium there
is non-monopolization with a positive probability.
The main conclusion of this subsection is the following. When there is a su¢ciently
high increase of the pro…t of a fringe …rm while the industry gets more concentrated, the
industry does not get completely monopolized. Part (iii) of Lemma 4 says that in the case
of complimentary products this situation is plausible. In the second part of this section we
consider other modi…cations of the basic game. This way we verify the robustness of our
non-monopolization result to natural extensions of the basic bargaining process for brands
purchasing.
3.2 Other variations of the short horizon model
Let us nowconsider three other natural modi…cations of thegame ¡1. Inthe …rst modi…cation
it is allowed for fringe …rms to submit ask prices for their businesses. This way we will verify
16how the monopolization result depends on the absence or presence of bargaining power of
a fringe …rm. This game will be denoted ¡
0
1. In the other games we address the issue of
simultaneity of o¤ers. There, we allow for the expanding …rm to make o¤ers sequentially.
In the …rst game the o¤ers are coming to fringe …rms in predetermined order, and in the
second game the leading …rm is allowed to choose a fringe …rm to whom to make an o¤er.
The extensive forms of the last two games are depicted on Figures 3 and 4. Lemmas 6–8
below describe subgame perfect Nash equilibria of these games. Also the possible equilibrium
payo¤s and resulting industry structures are established for these modi…cations of the main
game ¡1. This is done because this is cumbersome and beyond the main goal of study while
the resulting industry structure and pro…ts are of main interest. Let us proceed with the
formal description of the results.
Game ¡
0
1: This is a three stage game.
Stage 1: The expanding …rm makes simultaneous nonnegative o¤ers (z1;z2) to the fringe
…rms, and at the same time the fringe …rms submit nonnegative ask bids (r1;r2) for their
businesses.
Stage 2: If the ask bid ri of any fringe …rm i is less or equal than the corresponding o¤er
zi, the leading …rm pays ri to this …rm and gets control over its business.
Stage 3: Price competition by …rms in business is realized and they receive payo¤s accord-
ing to (3-5).19
Lemma 6 In the game ¡
0
1 an equilibrium where no fringe brand is captured always exists.
Also, there is a continuum of equilibria where one fringe is captured, and the acquired …rm
receives a nonnegative payment which is less than or equal to a. If b · 1=2; then any pair
of payments z1 and z2 from the leading …rm such that z1;z2 2 [b;1 ¡ a] and z1 + z2 · 1
corresponds to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with full monopolization.20
19This stage is exactly the same as stage 3 of the main game ¡1; and it is the last stage of the other
modi…cations of ¡1.
20At any full monopolization equilibrium ask bids are equal to corresponding o¤ers.
17PROOF: An equilibrium outcome of this game may result in any number of fringe …rms
acquired. The o¤ers (0;0) from the expanding …rm and ask bids (1;1) from the fringe …rms
yieldzero acquisitionin the industry, andthis constitutes asubgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
This shows that the non-monopolization outcome always takes place with zero payo¤s (extra
pro…ts) to all …rms.
Now suppose that only one fringe …rm i gets captured by the leading …rm. Any ask bid ri
such that ri 2 [0;a]; and an o¤er zi which is equal to ri; are equilibrium strategies given that
the other fringe …rm j asks the unity price rj = 1 and receives the zero o¤er21 zj = 0. Clearly,
in any equilibrium where only one …rm gets acquired no fringe …rm can receive more than
a for its business because in this case the expanding …rm would have negative extra pro…ts,
while zero o¤ers to the fringe …rms ensure nonnegative extra pro…ts.
In the situation when two …rms get acquired, each fringe …rm should receive at least b for
its business, otherwise a fringe …rm which receives less than b is able to submit an ask price
which is higher than the corresponding o¤er, break the deal, and get b units of extra pro…ts
by staying in the industry. Now let us …nd the upper bound for the values that fringe …rms
receive. We know that the expanding …rm is able to break any positive payment contract by
submitting the zero o¤er. So if it breaks one contract with price, say r, it does not have to
pay the value r but loses 1¡ a units of extra pro…ts. If it breaks two contracts it does not
have to pay equilibrium o¤ers to the fringe …rms but it loses one unit of extra pro…ts. Hence,
neither fringe …rm can count onmore than 1¡a transfer from the leading …rm, and the sum of
brand acquisition payments cannot be more than 1. Finally, one can verify that a quadruple
of ask bids r1 and r2 and o¤ers z1 and z2 such that r1 = z1 2 [b;1¡a]; r2 = z2 2 [b;1¡a] and
r1 + r2 · 1; yields a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We can …nd such quadruple only if
b · 1=2. Q.E.D.
In contrast to what happens in game ¡1 both fringe …rms are able to provide countero¤ers
in the game ¡
0
1. This gives them extra bargaining power. As a result there always exists an
21There are other o¤er-ask combinations which pevent an acquisition of the other fringe …rm.
18equilibrium where no brand is acquired. Also, there are equilibria where only one brand is
captured, and any part of the surplus a may go as a payment for the acquired brand. As for
the full monopolization, unlike the game ¡1 the complete capture seizes to exists when 2b > 1
which is a stronger condition than the one of the main game, 2b+a > 1. This still validates
the main conclusion of the paper. When 2b · 1; there are equilibria where fringe …rms are
captured, and the latter can receive any share of extra pro…ts as additional compensation for
being out of business (due to Lemma 4(iii)). Also, it is worth mentioning that due to the
presence ofan ask pricefor afringe …rm business there are equilibriawhere expandingdoes not
bene…t at all from the full industry monopolization.22 In spite of many interesting features,
in this paper the game ¡
0




1: There are …ve stages, an outcome of every stage is observable by each …rm.
Stage 1: The expanding …rm submits an o¤er z1 2 [0;+1) to fringe …rm 1.23
Stage 2: The …rst fringe …rm accepts (fAg) or rejects (fRg) this o¤er.
Stage 3: The expanding …rm makes an o¤er z2 2 [0;+1) to fringe …rm 2.
Stage 4: The second fringe …rm accepts (fAg) or rejects (fRg) this o¤er.
Stage 5: Price competition by the …rms in business is realized, and they receive payo¤s
according to (3-5).
Lemma 7 In the game ¡
00
1; if a+ 2b < 1; there is a unique equilibrium where both …rms get
acquired at the same price b. There is only one equilibrium where the second fringe …rm is
acquired at a zero price at stage 4, when a + 2b > 1. The case a + 2b = 1 yields both of the
above equilibria.
PROOF: All information sets of the game ¡
00
1 are singletons. Hence, any subgame perfect
equilibriumcaneasily be found by themethodof backwardinduction. Indeed, at stage 4fringe
22As will be seen later, a similar result holds for a dynamic setting, which plays a very crucial role for the
existence of non monopolization equilibria.
23In this game fringe …rms are indexed according to the order of o¤ers they get.
19Figure 3: Extensive form of game ¡
00
1.
…rm 2 accepts any nonnegative o¤er if the other fringe …rm has not got captured before, and
accepts any o¤er which is larger than or equal to b otherwise. Then at stage 3 the optimal
strategy of the leading …rm is to o¤er b to fringe …rm 2 if …rm 1 is acquired, and 0 otherwise.
Fringe …rm 2 accepts these o¤ers. Now let us analyze stage 2. Firm 1 “knows” that fringe
…rm 2 is going to be captured in any equilibrium history. Hence fringe …rm 1 gets b units of
extra pro…ts if it rejects the o¤er at stage 2. As a result, any o¤er lower than b is rejected,
and any o¤er larger than b is accepted under equilibrium play. Finally, at stage 1 by choosing
an o¤er to …rm 1 the expanding …rm is able to control the number of brands which are going
to be captured. In the case of two brands it gets at most 1 ¡ 2b units of extra pro…ts, and
in the case of one brand it gets a. The highest gains determine the strategy of the expanding
…rm in equilibrium. Q.E.D.
The game ¡
00
1 is a variation of the main game where the only di¤erence is that o¤ers are
coming sequentially to the fringe …rms and outcome of any bargaining process becomes public
knowledge. As it can be seen, if we do not care about the identity of captured …rms there is no
di¤erence in equilibrium outcomes between the games ¡1 and ¡
00
1. Hence, timing is irrelevant
for the bargaining process.
Game ¡
000
1 : This is a variation of the game ¡
00
1 which we call ¡
000
1 ; and it is almost the same
20as ¡
00
1 with an exception of the possibility for the expanding …rm to choose a fringe …rm to
which to make the o¤er. In particular, it is allowed to choose the same …rm twice.24 The
details follow.
Stage 1: The expanding …rm makes an o¤er z1 2 [0;+1) to fringe …rm 1 OR an o¤er
z2 2 [0;+1) to fringe …rm 2.
Stage 2: A fringe …rm which received the o¤er at previous stage accepts fAg or rejects
fRg it.
Stage 3: The expanding …rm makes an o¤er ¹ zi 2 [0;+1) to any fringe …rm i which is still
in business.
Stage 4: Fringe …rm i accepts fAg or rejects fRg the o¤er of stage 3.
Stage 5: Price competition by …rms in business is realized and they receive payo¤s accord-
ing to (3-5).
Lemma 8 In the game ¡
000
1 there is a continuum of equilibria where both fringe …rms get
captured with payments z 2 [0;minfb;1 ¡ a ¡ bg] and ¹ z = b, where z is the payment to the
fringe …rm which is acquired …rst, and ¹ z is that paid to the other fringe …rm. When a+2b > 1;
there are two additional equilibria where only one of two fringe …rms gets captured at a zero
price at stage 4.
PROOF: Analysis of the game ¡
000
1 is similar to that of the game ¡
00
1. Following the same
logic we conclude that at stage 3 at equilibrium play the leading …rm o¤ers b if there is a
single brand left in the industry, and 0 otherwise. At an equilibrium these o¤ers always get
accepted. The equilibrium behavior of a fringe …rm at stage 2 is di¤erent from that in the
game ¡
00
1. Acceptance of an o¤er depends on which brand will be targeted by the leading
…rm after rejection at stage 2. If this fringe …rm is going to be approached again, then any
nonnegative o¤er is going to be accepted, otherwise the fringe …rm only accepts o¤ers that
are no less than b. Hence, there is a possibility to construct an equilibrium where at stage 2
24Note that if a fringe …rm accepts an o¤er at stage 2 the leading …rm must submit an o¤er to the other
…rm.
21Figure 4: Extensive form of game ¡
000
1 .
some fringe …rm accepts an o¤er z 2 [0;b]; and the other fringe …rm accepts an o¤er of value
b. Since the leading …rm has net payo¤ of size a when at stage 4 it acquires only one fringe
…rm, this gives the following restriction for z net payo¤ from two brands acquisition: 1¡z¡b
is no less than a; or z · 1¡a¡b.25 Compared to the game ¡
00
1, where for the expanding …rm
25In the constructed equilibrium a fringe …rm, say i, which is o¤ered z; rejects any other o¤er which is
less or equal than b; because it “expects” that the other fringe …rm j will get captured later. This is why
a deviation of the expanding …rm if of the form: o¤er some c > 0 to …rm i at stage 1, and at stage 3 o¤er
"=2 to …rm i if the previous o¤er was rejected and o¤er b + " to …rm j; otherwise it is not bene…cial for the
expanding …rm. Indeed, given this deviation, if " is su¢ciently small under the equilibrium strategy, …rm i
rejects the o¤er and accepts the next o¤er which brings the payo¤ a ¡ "=2 to …rm 0.
22there is no freedom of choice of a target …rm, this yields a larger equilibrium set.26 Q.E.D.
Compared to the game ¡
00
1; in the game ¡
000
1 additional bargaining freedom is provided to
the expanding …rm. During a sequential bargaining process the leading …rm is allowed to
select a fringe …rm to which to make an o¤er. Hence, when a fringe …rm says “No” to the
very …rst o¤er, the expanding …rm has a right to approach again the same fringe …rm with
a new o¤er. This freedom to choose always assures the existence of an equilibrium where
both fringe …rms get captured. Here the …rm which is acquired last always gets b for its
business, while the other fringe …rm is compensated with a value which is no greater than
the minimum of 1 ¡ a ¡ b (additional extra surplus from this fringe …rm acquisition given
that the other fringe …rm is captured with the payment b) and b (the payo¤ that this fringe
…rm collects given that the other fringe …rm is out of the industry).27 Notice that in the
game ¡
000
1 we have a possibility of having zero extra bene…ts for the expanding …rm in the
fully monopolized industry. When extra pro…ts of all …rms from acquisition of just one brand
increase dramatically (more exactly, when a+2b > 1) there exists an equilibrium where only
one fringe …rm is acquired at a zero price. This happens because it is possible to support this
type ofequilibrium by a setof “beliefs” where the fringe…rm stayinginthe industry “believes”
that the other fringe …rm is going to be approached by the leading …rm. No deviation of the
leading …rm from the equilibrium strategy can a¤ect these “beliefs”. To summarize, there are
two types of equilibria: an additional bargaining power (the ability to select a fringe …rm to
which to make an o¤er) always creates an equilibrium with full monopolization but it does
not completely eliminate the non-monopolization equilibrium where the pro…ts from capture
26If one allows for the expanding …rm to mix over fringe …rms this does not change the set of equilibrium
payo¤ pro…les. This happens for the following reason: at any equilibrium in a subgame which starts at stage
4 and with two fringe …rms “survived” the leading …rm makes a zero o¤er with some probability ® to …rm 1
and with complementary probability to …rm 2. Any fringe …rm accepts her o¤er. This implies that at stage
2 …rm 1 has a secured payo¤ of (1 ¡ ®)b while …rm 2 has ®b. Because in order to construct any subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium there is a freedom to choose any equilibrium of stage 4 we have the same equilibrium
oucomes as with pure startegies.
27Note that in any equilibrium any fringe …rm accepts any o¤er that is stricly larger than b.
23of one brand rise dramatically.
3.3 Application to the inputs acquisition problem
Let us remind the reader that in the inputs acquisition problem input possession does not
have any e¤ect on any …rm’s pro…ts. Nowwe apply the four games constructed in the previous
subsection to this problem. This will provide a better picture of importance of the order of
acquisition. As stated before our model encompasses the inputs acquisition problem as a
special case with zero a and b. An application of Lemmas 5–8 shows that in any game but
¡
0
1 there is a unique equilibrium outcome with complete acquisition of inputs at a zero price.
Since in the game ¡
0
1 a fringe …rm has a right to provide a countero¤er for its business we
have a continuum of equilibria with any degree of monopolization. More speci…cally, when
only one input gets acquired, zero price is paid for it, but in the case of two inputs acquired
any share of extra monopoly pro…ts may be received by fringe …rms. Now let us present these
results formally.
Corollary of Lemmas 5-8 (Case of inputs acquisition ) When a = b = 0;




1 , both …rm get acquired at zero price
in the equilibrium;
(ii) in the game ¡
0
1 there is always an equilibrium where no fringe brand is captured. Also,
there is an equilibrium with one fringe acquired at a zero price, and there is a set of equilibria
where fringe …rms get acquired at prices z1 and z2 whose sum is less or equal to 1.
From the corollary it follows that when the leading …rm has a high bargaining power an
increase of pro…ts along with industry concentration is crucial for the industry concentration
outcome.
In the rest of the paper we investigate the issue of how important is the number of o¤ers
from the expanding …rm. The dynamic model is constructed and the following question is
addressed: Are there non monopolization equilibria where the value of b is high enough? In
the next section an in…nitely repeated variant of the game ¡
000
1 is analyzed. This game is
24chosen because it provides the highest degree of bargaining power to the leading …rm in the
market environment.
4 A dynamic environment
One may wonder whether the non-monopolization outcome presentina short horizon industry
holds in a repeated setting. To understand this better let us consider the following dynamic
game denoted as ¡2.28
There are in…nitely many time periods t = 0;1;2;:::;+1. It is assumed that at the
beginning of every time period t the expanding …rm is allowed to select a “target” fringe …rm
from non-captured fringe …rms. Then the leading …rm makes an o¤er and the fringe …rm of
interest accepts fAg (says Y es) or rejects fRg (says No) it. In the end of each time period
the expanding and non-captured fringe …rms receive instantaneous pro…ts according to the
benchmark model described in section 2. The net pro…t of …rms is measured as a discounted
sum of the instantaneous payments with a discount factor ± 2 (0;1).29 In the spirit of
Fudenberg and Tirole (1993) we normalize the discounted sum of instantaneous payo¤s by
the multiplier (1¡±). This allows us to compare payo¤s of constant payment schedules with
di¤erent discount factors. The continuation or net payo¤ of the expanding …rm is given by











and that of fringe …rm i is








28Our game is related to the “Division of Pie” game of Rubinstein (1982). Here, only one player makes
o¤ers. When some player accepts an o¤er all other agents continue to divide the rest of the pie plus additional
pieces of sizes a and b which came to them as a reward.
29In …nance the discounted stream of pro…ts corresponds to net present value of pro…ts with discounting
± = 1=(1+ r), where r is the interest rate.
25where s(t) stands for a number of fringe …rms captured by the end of time period t, ¿i is
timing of the capture30 of fringe …rm i, Pi is a payment to fringe …rm i made by the leading
…rm at time ¿i, and ¦i
s(t) stands for a normalized instantaneous pro…t of …rm i which is still




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
1; s = 2 and i = 0
a; s = 1 and i = 0
b; s = 1 and i > 0
0; o/w
By applying the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium concept to the game ¡2 we derive
the central result of the paper stated in Proposition 1 below. Let us provide an intuitive
description of an equilibrium behavior of the …rms. An absolute control over all brands raises
pro…ts in the industry to the monopoly level. An acquisition of just one brand allows the
expanding …rm to collect a share of extra pro…ts from monopolization, but this also has a
positivee¤ect onpro…ts which arecollectedby the non-acquired…rm. The …rm hasinaddition
b share of extra pro…ts from monopolization. Because further industry concentration yields
even higher pro…ts, we know that a + b < 1. Let us turn now our attention to the dynamic
game where all payo¤s are expressed in terms of net discounting.
When the leading …rm has full bargaining power and there is only one non-acquired …rm
in the industry, the fringe …rm gets immediately captured with the size of compensation
payment b; and the expanding …rm strictly bene…ts from this. When the leading …rm faces
two fringe …rms, the situation becomes not so trivial as in the case of one fringe …rm. The
size of compensation for the business of the …rst …rm to acquire is not uniquely de…ned. It
depends on the expectation of the fringe …rm. If it believes that after rejecting the o¤er
the other fringe …rm will be acquired in the next period, then according to the subgame
perfection paradigm this fringe …rm never accepts any o¤er which is lower than ±b (extra
pro…ts after a capture of the other …rm). On the opposite, if it believes that there will be
no attempts to acquire the other fringe …rm unless this fringe …rm agrees, then the …rm of
30An in…nite value of ¿ i corresponds to ultimate survival of fringe …rm i.
26interest accepts any nonnegative o¤er. All this allows one to construct a set of equilibria
where one of the fringe …rms accepts some o¤er z · ±b (at any equilibrium no fringe …rm
can count on more than ±b) in the …rst time period, and the other takes o¤er b in the next
period. We call this type of situation immediate monopolization. Howhigh the o¤er z can be
depends on the level of bene…ts of the leading …rm from immediate monopolization, which is
equal to [(1¡ ±)=±]a + ±. The total payment z +±b cannot be higher than this value. When
b becomes large this constraint becomes binding which yields immediately monopolization
equilibria with z = [(1¡±)=±]a+±¡±b where the leading …rm does not get any extra pro…ts.
The presence of such a nonpro…table equilibrium provides an equilibrium where there is no
any capture. In this equilibrium the expanding …rm always o¤ers zeros and fringe …rms reject
such o¤ers. This kind of behavior corresponds to the subgame perfection concept if for any
nonzero o¤er the leading …rm expects that this o¤er is going to be rejected with a follow up
of immediate nonbene…tial monopolization, and the fringe …rm which makes this rejection
expects a payo¤ of ±b. Let us stress that no …rm can unilaterally a¤ect this system of beliefs.
In a similar fashion it is possible to construct an equilibrium play where monopolization
begins at an arbitrary time period. So far we have assumed that the value b is so high
that there is nonbene…cial for the expanding …rm monopolization. When b is low, it is still
possible to put o¤ monopolization for some time. Here the leading …rm o¤ers zero, and the
fringe …rms reject these o¤ers till some time ¿ when monopolization starts. The expanding
…rm get “scared” by subequilibria where it has to pay ±b to each …rm, or 2±b in total. Of
course, …rm 0 will only wait for monopolization where it has to pay less with a minimal
perceivable payment of ±b. Hence, a complete capture can be delayed till time ¿ when the
value ±¿f[(1 ¡ ±)=±]a + ± ¡ z ¡ ±bg is no larger than f[(1¡ ±)=±]a + ± ¡ 2±bg, where z is the
payment to the …rm which gets captured …rst. Note that for any positive b and any ¿ there
is ± su¢ciently high such that monopolization can be postponed till time ¿.
Proposition 1 At any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game ¡2 there are two pos-
sible outcomes:
27(i) Both fringe …rms get acquired successively, …rst one in some time period ¿1 = ¿, and
the second one in the subsequent time ¿2 = ¿ + 1. Net payo¤s are
¼
0 = [(1¡ ±)a +± ¡ ±b¡ z]±
¿;
¼1 = z±¿ and ¼2 = b±¿+1;
where fringe …rms are indexed in order of their exiting the industry. z 2 [0;min(±b;(1¡±)a+
± ¡ ±b)] is a payment to fringe …rm 1 and b is the compensation to …rm 2.













(ii) When b ¸ 1
2 +
(1¡±)
2± a ´ ¹ b; there is an equilibrium with no fringe …rm acquisition.
Remark (i) For the leading …rm the most bene…cial payo¤ takes place when acquisition
starts in the …rst time period with zero initial payment. Here the expanding …rm receives a
strictly positive payo¤ of a+±(1¡a¡b). (ii) The least bene…cial payo¤ is equal to maxfa+
±(1¡a¡2b); 0g. The …rst expression comes for low b < ¹ b from an equilibrium where the …rst
acquired fringe …rm get captured at the price z = [(1¡ ±)a +±¡±b] ¡±
¡¿[(1¡ ±)a+ ±¡2±b]
at time ¿ satisfying (7). (In particular, z = ±b when ¿ = 0.) When b is high or when b ¸ ¹ b;
the leading …rm gets zero payo¤ because of the absence of any capture, or because it pays
(1¡±)a+±¡±b to the …rst acquired …rm and ±b to the other one. In this way all extra pro…ts
of the expanding …rm go to the fringe …rms.
PROOF: At the beginning of any time period t; due to the symmetry between the fringe
…rms there are three genuinely di¤erent states of the game ¡2. These states correspond to
the number of acquired fringe …rms s 2 f0;1;2g. The game starts at the state s = 0, then in
some time period ¿1 2 f0;1;:::;+1g it switches to the state s = 1 and then it switches to the
state s = 2 in the time period ¿2 2 f¿1+1;:::;+1g. Hence, any history of game states when
there is eventual monopolization can be described by a sequence of two nonnegative integer
28values ¿1 and ¿2, ¿2 > ¿1. A history without a complete capture can still be described by a
pair of numbers that take an in…nite value in the case of nonacquisition.31 For example, the
case with ¿1 = 0 and ¿2 = +1 corresponds to a capture of just one fringe …rm at the …rst
time period.
All possible subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the game ¡2 can be found by backward
induction on states. First, we …nd all subgame perfect Nash equilibria in a subgame which
starts at the state s = 2. Next we move to a subgame which begins at the state s = 1; and
then to the state s = 0, at which the whole game starts. To simplify the analysis we assume
that in any subgame the timing starts from zero: ¿ = 0;1;2;:::;+1, where ¿ is the “internal
time” of a subgame of interest.
Equilibria at the state s = 2 : When a subgame starts at the state s = 2; no …rm has an
action to choose. Hence, there is a unique equilibrium with continuation payo¤s (¼0;¼1;¼2) =
(1;0;0).
Equilibria at the state s = 1 : There are two …rms in business: one is the leading …rm, and
the other is a fringe …rm. We mark these …rms 0 and 1 correspondingly. When the fringe …rm
is not acquired, the instantaneous payo¤ to the expanding …rm is a; and that for the fringe
…rm is b.
Let us show that possible continuation payo¤s of …rm 1 are equal to b. First, they are
no less than b. Indeed, the fringe …rm is able to secure the value b by rejecting all o¤ers all
the time. And second, let ¹ v be the supremum of the subgame perfect continuation payo¤s
of the fringe …rm. If in any time period ¿ the leading …rm makes an o¤er which is higher
than (1¡ ±)b +±¹ v (current period payo¤, given that the o¤er is rejected, plus the maximum
possiblefuturecontinuationpayo¤ fromthe next time period), then by the one stage deviation
principle (we will frequently use it in this proof, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1993) for details)
the fringe …rm must accept this o¤er in any equilibrium strategy. Hence, the upper bound
for ¹ v is (1 ¡ ±)b + ±¹ v or ¹ v · b. Indeed, suppose that there is an equilibrium where …rm 1
31Note that the in…nite value implies that the correspoding state never arises in the equilibrium history.
29accepts an o¤er z in some time period ¿; and z > (1¡ ±)b + ±¹ v. When …rm 0 reduces z to
o¤er z0 that satis…es the condition z > z0 > (1¡±)b+±¹ v, the fringe …rm accepts it while the
expanding …rm increases its payo¤. Hence, in any subgame perfect equilibrium …rm 1 receives
a continuation payo¤ b.
Because the fringe …rm has a continuation payo¤ which is equal to b; any equilibrium
history should be such that in some time period ¿ the fringe …rm accepts the o¤er b=(1¡ ±);
or there is no acquisition at all (¿ = +1). Also, from the one stage deviation principle it
follows that in any equilibrium strategy …rm 1 accepts any o¤er which is strictly larger than
b=(1¡ ±); and rejects any o¤er which is strictly less than b=(1 ¡ ±). Let us …nd out possible
equilibrium values of ¿. If in time period 0 the leading …rm makes an o¤er z > b=(1 ¡ ±),
the fringe …rm accepts it. In this case …rm 0 receives continuation value 1¡ z instead of the
equilibrium payo¤ (1¡ ±
¿)a + ±
¿(1 ¡ b). Hence, for the equilibrium value of ¿ it necessarily
holds that (1 ¡ ±
¿)a +±
¿(1¡ b) ¸ (1¡ b) or (1 ¡ ±
¿)(a + b¡ 1) ¸ 0. Because, according to
Lemma 4(ii), the sum of a and b is smaller than 1, we have that at the equilibrium ¿ = 0.
One can check that the strategy pro…le where …rm 0 always o¤ers b=(1¡ ±) and …rm 1 only
rejects o¤ers which are strictly less than b=(1 ¡ ±); yields an equilibrium. Hence there is a
unique equilibrium outcome: In the …rst time period the leading …rm o¤ers b=(1¡ ±) and the
fringe …rm accepts it. Firms receive continuation payo¤s (¼0;¼1) = (1¡ b;b). In the further
analysis of this equilibrium we use notation E1 or E2; where the subscript corresponds to the
index of a fringe …rm in business.
Equilibria at state s = 0 : From the analysis above it follows that any equilibrium history
has the following form: one fringe …rm accepts some nonnegative o¤er z=(1¡±) in some time
period ¿; and in time period ¿ + 1 the other fringe …rm accepts an o¤er of size b=(1¡ ±). In
the case of non-acquisition ¿ takes an in…nite value. Hence, in any equilibrium a continuation







The payo¤s are determined by which fringe …rm is acquired …rst and which o¤er it accepts.
Let us …nd possible equilibrium values of z. Let ¹ z be a supremum of these. When there are
30two fringe …rms in the industry, any fringe …rm accepts any o¤er which is strictly greater than
±max(¹ z;b)=(1¡±), because in the case of rejection it receives a lower equilibrium continuation
payo¤. As a result, ± max(¹ z;b) ¸ ¹ z; or ¹ z · ±b. Because the leading …rm is able to secure a
zero continuation payo¤ by o¤ering zero all the time it follows that at any equilibrium the
expanding …rm payo¤ must be nonnegative, or (1¡±)a+±¡z ¡±b ¸ 0. All the above yields
the following restriction for ¹ z:
¹ z · Z ´ min(±b;(1¡ ±)a+ ± ¡ ±b): (8)
The next step of the analysis is to show that the inequality holds with equality, and any z
in the segment [0;Z] corresponds to some equilibrium. Let us consider the following strategy
pro…le: …rm 0 “always o¤ers z¤=(1 ¡ ±) for some z¤ 2 [0;Z] to fringe …rm 1 until this o¤er
gets accepted, and then always o¤ers b=(1 ¡ ±) to …rm 2”, …rm 1 “accepts any o¤er larger
than or equal to z¤=(1 ¡ ±); and rejects other o¤ers”, and …rm 2 “only accepts o¤ers which
are no smaller than b=(1¡±)”. This pro…le forms an equilibrium, where …rm 1 gets purchased
with the payment z¤=(1¡±) in time 0; and …rm 2 gets captured at the price b=(1¡±) in time
1.32 Hence, for equilibria with ¿ = 0 possible continuation payo¤s are ((1 ¡±)a +± ¡ z ¡ ±b;
z; b) or ((1 ¡ ±)a + ± ¡ z ¡ ±b; b; z); z 2 [0;Z]. In the rest of the proof we will check for
other equilibria with positive ¿. There are two possibilities which di¤er by which value, ±b or
(1¡ ±)a +± ¡±b; is minimal in the formula (8) for Z. We consider each situation separately.
Situation (1¡±)a+± · 2±b: Here, Z = (1¡±)a+±¡±b. Let the equilibrium belonging to
the ones constructedabove be denoted as Ei(z); i 2 f1;2g; z 2 [0;Z]. In the equilibrium Ei(z)
…rm i is acquired at ¿ = 0 at the price z=(1¡±); and the other …rm gets captured at ¿ = 1 with
the payment b=(1 ¡ ±). Notice that in Ei(Z);i = 1;2 a continuation payo¤ of the expanding
…rm is zero. By the way of these non-bene…cial equilibria for the leading …rm it is possible













z¤) for any ¿¤ ¸ 0 and any z · Z.
This means that industry monopolization can be postponed to an arbitrary time period, and
32The optimality of these strategies can be checked by the one stage deviation principle.
31the leading …rm is able to buy the …rst fringe …rm at any price which allows for nonnegative
extra pro…ts.33 Now let us describe an equilibrium strategy pro…le which corresponds to the
acquisition of fringe …rm 1 …rst (for …rm 2 the same strategy can be used by switching fringe
…rms).
At the equilibrium history the leading …rm always o¤ers zero to …rm 1, which the fringe
…rm rejects, till time ¿¤; and then all …rms continue to play according to the subequilibrium
E1(z¤) fromtime¿¤on. Nowletus specify the…rms’ equilibrium play whentheexpanding …rm
deviates from the equilibrium strategy at time ¿ · ¿¤. Namely, fringe …rm i which receives
an o¤er of z=(1 ¡ ±) does the following: it rejects it when z < ±b; and accepts other o¤ers.
After rejection the game continues with the subequilibrium Ej(Z); j 6= i; and with acceptance
game moves to state s = 1, for which the subgame perfect equilibrium payo¤s are uniquely
speci…ed. For all subgames that start from those game histories which are not equilibrium
ones, or where the leading …rm has just deviated, any subequilibria can be assigned, say, the
subequilibrium E1 for a subgame with state s = 1; and E1(0) for a subgame with state s = 0.
The above strategies are subgame perfect. Indeed, no fringe …rm gets a positive payo¤
from unilateral deviation along the equilibrium path at any time ¿ < ¿¤ (more exactly, …rm
2 does not have an option to choose, and …rm 1’s deviation is to accept a zero o¤er). As for
the leading …rm, when it deviates at ¿ · ¿¤ it receives no more than zero, because if it o¤ers
more than or equal to ±b to some fringe …rm, the o¤er gets accepted with the subsequent net
payment ±b to the other fringe …rm in the next time period, while the net extra pro…ts are
equal to (1¡±)a+± (extra pro…ts from a partial industry capture in the current period plus
the continuation extra pro…ts from complete monopolization). An o¤er to some fringe …rm
i of net value less than ±b yields a zero payo¤ to the expanding …rm because the fringe …rm
rejects this o¤er due to continuation of game into the subequilibrium Ei(Z) where …rm i gets
net payo¤ ±b and …rm 0 receives zero.
There areno other equilibrium payo¤pro…les because Z is a maximum possible equilibrium
paymentto thefringe…rm whichis acquired…rst, and we haveshowed that any payment which
33Note that ¿¤ can be in…nite which corresponds to everlasting operation of fringe …rms in the industry.
32is no greater than Z to any fringe …rm can happen at any time period.
Situation (1¡±)a+± > 2±b: Here, Z = ±b. Inthiscase anonmonopolizationoutcome is not
possible, but monopolization can be postponed to some time period ¿ by the same strategies
constructed in the previous situation. Let us check which pair of a continuation payo¤ z¤ of
the …rst captured …rm and time of its acquisition ¿¤ can be supported in equilibrium. Given a
pair z¤ and ¿¤ the leading …rm obtains the continuation payo¤ ¼¤ = ±
¿¤
[(1¡±)a+±¡z¤¡±b].
If this value is strictly smaller than ~ ¼ = (1 ¡ ±)a + ± ¡ 2±b; then the expanding …rm has
deviation at time ¿ = 0 where it o¤ers z = ±b + (~ ¼ ¡ ¼¤)=2 to any fringe, this o¤er gets
accepted (no fringe …rm can count of a net payo¤ larger than ±b), and the expanding …rm
receives (¼¤ + ~ ¼)=2. Because of a possibility for such deviation it follows that the condition
±
¿¤
[(1¡ ±)a +± ¡ z
¤ ¡ ±b] ¸ (1¡ ±)a +± ¡ 2±b (9)
is necessary for the equilibrium z¤ and ¿¤. Since at any time ¿ any deviation of the leading
…rm leads to a continuation play where every fringe …rm gets at least ±b as a continuation
payo¤ whilethe expanding …rm gets net extra pro…ts (1¡±)a+±. This yields aset of su¢cient
conditions ±
¿ ¤
[(1 ¡ ±)a + ± ¡ z¤ ¡ ±b] ¸ ±
¿[(1¡ ±)a +± ¡ 2±b];¿ = 0;:::;¿¤, which makes the
condition (9) su¢cient. Q.E.D.
The positiveness of b is very crucial for the presence of a variety of equilibria. We conclude
this section with a discussion of the situation with zero b. When b = 0; both fringe …rms
get captured at zero prices during …rst two periods. Hence, an increase in pro…ts of a fringe
…rm while the other non-leading …rm gets captured dramatically a¤ects possible equilibrium
payo¤s. For the case of the inputs acquisition problem or Bertrand competition (zero values
of a and b), let us state the following result.
Corollary of Proposition 1 (The case of inputs acquisition or Bertrand competition
(° = +1)) When a = b = 0; in any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game ¡2 both
fringe …rms get successively acquired at zero prices: the …rst one in time period 0; and the
second one in period 1. The …rms’ payo¤s are ¼0 = ±, ¼1 = 0; and ¼2 = 0.
33In the next section we provide a brief discussion of how robust our results are when there
are more than two fringe …rms in the industry. Also, new conclusions will be derived.
5 Case of many fringe …rms
Suppose now that there are n (n ¸ 2) fringe …rms in the industry. As before, the discrete
variable s stands for the number of captured fringe …rms, and let A be a set of brands under
control of the expanding …rm. Also, we denote the set of all brands by I. Under the demand
given by (1) price competition yields a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium the pro…t
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(10)
where s is equal to the number of elements in the set A; or s = jAj.
The benchmark model can naturally be extended to a situation of more than two fringe
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where jI=Aj is the number of non-captured brands which is equal to n ¡ s.
It was shown by Deneckere and Davidson (1985) that values as(°) and bs(°) are increasing
in s for a positive °. This re‡ects the fact that the higher industry concentration the higher
pro…ts are of the leading …rm and non-captured fringe …rms. Since in the case of two fringe
…rms we have shown existence of non-monopolization for negative values of °, in this section
we check for a possibility of having non-monopolization when ° is positive.
The games which are analyzed above can be extended to the case of many fringe …rms in
a natural way. In the rest of the section we describe extensions of the main games ¡1 and ¡2,
34Let us point out that bn(°) is not de…ned, because for s = n all brands are controlled by the leading …rm.
34which are of the central interest in this paper, and investigate under which conditions these
games still have subgame perfect equilibria with non-monopolization.
n-fringe …rms generalized game ¡1 :
Stage 1: The expanding …rm makes simultaneous o¤ers (z1;z2;:::;zn) to fringe …rms for
their businesses.
Stage 2: Each fringe …rm i; i 2 1;:::;n; observes all o¤ers and simultaneously with the
other fringe …rm accepts (fAg) or rejects (fRg) its corresponding o¤er zi.
Stage 3: Price competition by …rms in business (the expanding …rm and fringe …rm(s)
who rejected the o¤er) takes place, and the …rms in business receive pro…ts from the brands
they control, according to formula (10), while the fringe …rms who get captured get payments
from the leading …rm.
Application of the subgame perfection concept to this game implies that given an equilib-
rium number s¤ of acquired fringe …rms, …rm i accepts any o¤er which is higher than bs¤¡1;
and rejects o¤ers which are smaller. Hence, the optimal behavior of the leading …rm is to
o¤er bs¤¡1 to all fringe …rms which will be captured in the equilibrium. The number of brands
s¤ to acquire is chosen by the leading …rm on the following basis. It maximizes the di¤erence
between the extra pro…t as¤(°) and total payment to the fringe …rms s¤bs¤¡1(°). Because
the expanding …rm has strictly positive extra pro…ts when one fringe …rm is acquired, we
have that at least one fringe …rm gets captured in equilibrium. More exactly, the equilibrium
number of captured fringe …rms is given by
s
¤ 2 arg max
s=1;:::;nfas(°)¡ sbs¡1(°)g:
When bn¡1(°) ¸ 1=n; it immediately follows that in equilibrium we have at least one non-
captured …rm. The following proposition shows this formally, and in addition it describes
what happens when a number of fringe …rms becomes larger.
Proposition 2 When bn¡1(°) ¸ 1=n and ° is positive, all equilibria in the n-fringe …rms
generalized game ¡1 are non-monopolization. Moreover, for any ° > 0 (any degree of products
35substitutability) there is su¢ciently large n¤ such that for any n ¸ n¤ the value bn¡1(°) is
strictly higher than 1=n.
PROOF: Because an(°) = 1, a1(°) > 0andb0(°) = 0; the…rst statementof the proposition
holds because full monopolization yields non-positive extra pro…ts, while acquisition of just
one …rm makes it positive. Now let us prove the second statement.
Let m denote a number of fringe …rms captured. When m is equal to zero, each brand
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Finally, the value which is critical for full monopolization is the pro…t ^ ¦
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single “survived” fringe …rm collects. Without loss of generality it can be assumed that this
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Given ° > 0; the function ^ ¦n¡1












By de…nition, the value of bn¡1 is equal to
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> 1:
35To take a limit it is su¢cient to eliminate terms with n in equation (11).
36Hence, for any ° > 0 there is such n¤ that for any n ¸ n¤ we have bn¡1 ¸ 1=n. Q.E.D.
Now let us brie‡y discuss the n-fringe …rms generalized game ¡2. Here in any time
period the leading …rm has a right to make an o¤er to any fringe …rm. Because in this game
there aremore potential states36 (to be exact, there aren+1of them)than in the game ¡2; the
analysis of all equilibriabecomes extremely complicated. Still, as in theprevious section, when
bn¡1 issu¢ciently highthere are subgame perfect equilibria where theexpanding …rmgets zero
continuation payo¤, or it does not receive any additional pro…ts from monopolization. These
equilibria allow one to construct an equilibrium where no fringe …rm gets ever acquired. As in
the previous section a “non-bene…cial monopolization” equilibrium can be used to “punish”
all deviations of the leading …rm from the equilibrium play. Also, monopolization can be
postponed for some time for “moderate” values of bn¡1. The higher the value of bn¡1 or
the discount factor ±; the longer monopolization process may last. Let us state an analog of
Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 When bn¡1(°) > 1=n and ° is positive, there is such ±
¤ than for any discount
factor ± that satis…es ± ¸ ±
¤; the n-fringe …rms generalized game ¡2 has a subgame perfect
equilibrium with non-monopolization.
PROOF: Here we outline the main steps of the proof. Most ideas are similar to the
ones in the proof of Proposition 1. Again, all payments are expressed in terms of net or
discounted values. If there is immediate monopolization (n brands get acquired during …rst n
periods), the last fringe …rm receives net payment ±
n¡1bn¡1(°). Given the structure of beliefs
consistent with every fringe …rm’s expectation of being the last in the acquisition sequence,
it is perceivable that the expanding …rm pays up to TP = n±
n¡1bn¡1(°) in total, whereas






¤ < 1 be such that the total payments TP are equal to the total bene…ts TB (such ±
¤
exists because bn¡1(°) > 1=n). Then for every ± such that ± ¸ ±
¤ it is possible to construct a
36Each state corresponds to the number of captured fringe …rms.
37subgame perfectequilibrium wheretheindustry gets immediately monopolizedwithzeroextra
pro…ts for the expanding …rm, and the payment ±
n¡1bn¡1(°) for the last active fringe …rm.
Because of these non-bene…cial equilibria there is an equilibrium where in the equilibrium
play the leading …rm always o¤ers zeros, and fringe …rms reject these o¤ers. All other o¤ers
which are smaller than ±n¡1bn¡1(°) are also rejected in the equilibrium, because the fringe
…rm under o¤er believes that it will receive ±
n¡1bn¡1(°). In turn, the expanding …rm believes
that any nonzero o¤er will bring it nonpositive extra pro…ts. Q.E.D.
From the second part of Proposition 2 it follows that given any degree of substitutability
of products the more fringe …rms in an industry the more likely non-monopolization is. Let
us also point out that unlike the two fringe …rms situation a new type of equilibria emerges.
In these equilibria only some of fringe …rms get acquired eventually. Also, it can be more
than one period time gap between successive captures when at least three fringe …rm are left
to acquire.
We conclude this section with a discussion of the inputs acquisition problem. It can be
checked that as in the case of two fringe …rms in the n-fringe …rms generalizations of games
¡1 and ¡2 all fringe …rms get acquired at zero prices. Moreover, in the in…nite time setting
all n fringe …rms get captured during the …rst n time periods.
6 Conclusion
It has been shown that inpresence of positive correlation between industry concentration and
fringe …rm’s pro…t, a fringe …rm can value its business higher than present value of pro…ts it
actually collects (business overvaluation). This may decrease potential gains from industry
monopolization for the expanding …rm, and in some cases it can make them so low that the
leading …rm does not get any positive extrapro…ts which canstop the monopolization process.
Other two e¤ects of business overvaluation are delayed industry monopolization and that all
the extra pro…t from monopolization goes to fringe …rms (the leading …rm stays break even).
In this paper various bargaining processes of acquisition, including the ones where a leading
38…rm has an absolute bargaining power, are inspected. In all of them, the presence of the e¤ect
of business overvaluation was revealed.
Ina pricecompetingindustrywithdi¤erentiatedproducts thepossibility of non-monopolization
depends on the substitutability of brands. The lower the degree of substitutability the more
likely it is. This happens because for close substitutes there is a slow increase in fringe …rms
pro…ts with the industry concentration.
It can be argued that a lack of bargaining rounds for the leading …rm may be a cause of
the absence of monopolization. Addition of extra rounds in the games of interest does not
eliminate non-monopolization outcomes, even when the subgame perfect re…nement concept
is applied. An introduction of countero¤ers from fringe …rms just facilitates the main results
due to a decrease in the bargaining power of the leading …rm.
There is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium payo¤ pro…le in the dynamic bargaining
where the leading …rm has full bargaining power and there are no gains for the fringe …rms
from industry concentration. The fringe…rms get paid their net pro…ts, and they get captured
right away. Business overvaluatione¤ect gives rise to multiple subgame perfect equilibria with
di¤erent payo¤ pro…les and timings of capture. Because in a dynamic game every information
set is a singleton, application of other re…nement concepts does not reduce a set of subgame
perfect equilibria. A solution of the issue of multiplicity of equilibria is a topic of future
research.
7 Appendix
Analysis of Lemma 5 with mixed strategies at stage 2 of game ¡1
Lemma 9 If the fringe …rms can play mixed strategies at stage 2, the game ¡1 has the
following outcome pro…le as subgame perfect equilibria: If 2b+a < 1; both …rms get captured
at the price of b for each. When 2b + a = 1; there are two equilibria: two …rms are captured
at the price of b for each, and only one fringe …rm gets acquired at a zero price. Finally, in

















isthe supremum of possible payo¤s that the expanding …rm getsat stage 2 whenNash equilibria
with the lowest payo¤s are selected. Let ¼¤ be an expected extra pro…t of the leading …rm. There
are three types of equilibria:
(i) The expanding …rm captures one fringe …rm at the nonnegative price a¡¼¤, given that
¼¤ 2 [¼(a;b);a);
(ii) One fringe …rm accepts the o¤er z and the other …rm accepts the o¤er b with probability
¸ · z=b. Only a pair of z and ¸ such that ¼¤ = (1 ¡ a ¡ b)¸ + z 2 [¼(a;b);a) yields this
equilibrium;
(iii) The leading …rmsubmits o¤ersz1;z2 2 (0;b). Firm 1 accepts thiso¤er with probability
z2=b; and …rm 2 takes this o¤er with probability z1=b. This equilibrium exists when ¼¤ =
[(1¡ 2a¡ 2b)z1z2+ (z1 + z2)ab]=b2 2 [¼(a;b);a).
PROOF: At any subgame perfect equilibrium the leading …rm o¤ers (z¤
1;z¤
2), then it re-
ceives an expected payo¤ ¼¤ (equilibrium payo¤) which is an outcome of some Nash equilib-
rium in the subgame ~ ¡1(z¤
1;z¤
2). Any deviation (z1;z2) 6= (z¤
1;z¤
2) brings such an equilibrium
in the subgame ~ ¡1(z1;z2), where the expanding …rm gets an expected payo¤ (threat payo¤)
that is no larger than ¼¤. Any game ~ ¡1(z1;z2) is a 2 £ 2 game, where each fringe …rm has
two strategies: accept an o¤er fAg and reject an o¤er fRg. The normal form of the subgame
~ ¡1(z1;z2) is depicted on Figure 2. Let us …nd out possible values of ¼¤ and corresponding
equilibria in ~ ¡1(z¤
1;z¤
2). This will be done in a number of steps. First, we investigate all
possible equilibria in mixed strategies in the subgames ~ ¡1(z1;z2);(z1 ¸ 0;z2 ¸ 0), which for
brevity we just call mixed equilibria. Second, possible threat payo¤s are constructed, and
…nally, equilibrium payo¤s are calculated.
Step 1: Characterization of all mixed equilibria in subgames ~ ¡1(z1;z2).
40Any fringe …rm has a dominant strategy fAg (accept an o¤er) when it is o¤ered more
than b. Hence, it follows that any subgame ~ ¡1(z1;z2) where z1 > b and z2 > b, has a unique
equilibrium fA;Ag with the corresponding payo¤ of 1 ¡ z1 ¡ z2 to the expanding …rm. This
implies that ¼¤ ¸ 1 ¡2b; and a fringe …rm does not “mix” strategies when it is o¤ered more
than b.
When some fringe …rm i is o¤ered zi = b; it is indi¤erent between strategies fAg and fRg
given that the other fringe …rm j accepts its o¤er. If the other …rm puts positive probability
on the strategy fRg then …rm i’s strict best response is fAg. Hence, given these facts the only
possible mixed equilibrium is of the following form: …rm i plays f¸A+ (1¡¸)Rg; ¸ 2 (0;1);
and …rm j plays fAg, where …rm i chooses the strategy fAg with probability ¸; and fRg with
the complementary probability. Now it is necessary for the …rm j to have fAg as the best
response. This happens when zj ¸ ¸b. Hence, there is a set of mixed equilibria of the form
f¸A+ (1¡ ¸)R;Ag;¸ · z2=b in any subgame ~ ¡1(b;z2); and fA;¸A+ (1¡ ¸)Rg;¸ · z1=b in
any subgame ~ ¡1(z1;b), where the leading …rm receives payo¤s ¸(1 ¡ b) + (1 ¡ ¸)a ¡ z2 and
¸(1¡b)+(1¡¸)a¡z1; correspondingly. Note that when zj > b; all equilibria are of the above
type. Since 1¡ b > a (see Lemma 4), the payo¤ of …rm 0 is strictly increasing in ¸ and takes
any value in segment [a¡zj;1¡b¡zj]. When zj < b; the payo¤ to …rm 0 lies in the interval
[a ¡ zj;(1¡ b)zj=b+ (1¡ zj=b)a ¡ zj]. Also, when zj < b; there is an additional equilibrium
where …rm i plays fAg and …rm j plays fRg; and the expanding …rm gets a¡b < 0. Finally,
in the subgame ~ ¡1(b;b) we have a set of equilibria f¸A+(1¡¸)R;Ag and fA;¸A+(1¡¸)Rg;
¸ 2 [0;1], where the payo¤ of the expanding …rm lies within the range [1¡2b;a¡ b]. We will
return to the subgames considered here, which we call b-subgames.
Now let us investigate situations where fringe …rm i is o¤ered zi < b. When zj > b; there
are no mixed equilibria in a proper subgame. The case zj = b is studied in the previous
paragraph. The last set of subgames of the form ~ ¡1(z1;z2); z1 < b; z2 < b is left to analyze.
Any of these subgames has two equilibria in pure strategies, they are fA;Rg and fR;Ag, and
one mixed equilibrium f[z2=b]A+[1¡ z2=b]R;[z1=b]A+[1¡ z1=b]Rg.37 The expanding …rm
37When z1 = z2 = 0; the mixed equilibrium becomes a “pure” equilibrium fR;Rg.
41gets a ¡ z1; a ¡ z2 and f(1¡ 2a ¡ 2b)z1z2 +(z1 +z2)abg=b2; correspondingly.
Step 2: Calculation of guarantied level of threat payo¤s.
Now let us turn attention to the supremum of threat equilibrium payo¤s over all possible
pairs (z1;z2) because at any Nash equilibrium …rm 0 gets at least this value. We denote by
¼ the minimum level this supremum takes. As derived at Step 1, when both o¤ers z1 and
z2 are larger than b the corresponding subgame ~ ¡1(z1;z2) has only one equilibrium yielding
1¡ z1 ¡z2 to the expanding …rm. Hence, ¼ ¸ 1¡ 2b.
One can check that in any b-subgame and at any equilibrium the expanding …rm has the
payo¤ that is no larger than a ¡ b. Hence, ¼ ¸ a ¡b.
When one o¤er, say z1, is strictly larger than b; and the other is strictly smaller than b;
the corresponding subgame has a single equilibrium fA;Rg, where …rm 0 receives a¡z1. This
gives the same restriction ¼ ¸ a¡ b.
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Given that the values of a and b belong to the open set - = f(a;b) : 0 < a < b and
a + b < 1g (Lemma 4 shows that that parameters a and b belong to this set), a careful
analysis of (12) shows that at the maxmin value all three expressions in the curly brackets
take equal values. This allows one to get a closed form expression for the function ½(a;b):









Next, one can show that the function g(a;b) ´ ½(a;b)=a is continuous on the set -, and is in-





g(a;b) = 1. This shows that the function ½(a;b) takes values within the interval
(0;a). Finally, we have the following formula for the function ¼(a;b) depicted on Figure 5:
¼(a;b) = maxf1¡ 2b;½(a;b)g: (14)
42Figure 5: Graph of function ¼(a;b) on set -.
Step 3: Description of equilibria.
Because the analysis is restricted to subgame perfect equilibria, at the equilibrium play
the leading …rm receives payo¤s that are no smaller than ¼(a;b) given by (14). Because
¼(a;b) ¸ maxf1 ¡ 2b;0g; the equilibrium subgames correspond to o¤ers that are no larger
than b. When 1¡ 2b ¸ a; only equilibria of Lemma 5 arise. An interesting case is that when
1 ¡ 2b < a. Let us describe new equilibria that emerge in this case in addition to the ones
described in Lemma 5. There are three types of equilibria:
b-equilbria (one …rm accepts her o¤er and the other accepts o¤er b with some probability
¸): Here the expanding …rm obtains any expected payo¤ ¼¤ 2 [¼(a;b);a). From the descrip-
43tion of b-equilibria at Step 1 it follows that a fringe …rm, say i, is o¤ered b; and the other …rm
j accepts the o¤er zj. The …rm i accepts the o¤er withprobability ¸ = (¼¤+zj¡a)=(1¡a¡b).
Because ¸ 2 (0;zj=b]; it follows that zj 2 [a ¡ ¼¤;(a¡ ¼¤)b=(1¡ a ¡ 2b)].
One …rm captured equilibria: The leading …rm captures one fringe …rm at a positive o¤er
of a¡¼¤ and receives ¼¤ 2 [¼(a;b);a) of extra pro…ts. The other …rm is o¤ered no more than
b.
Totally mixed equilibria: Here both fringe …rms have positive o¤ers z1 and z2 which
are strictly smaller than b. Under these o¤ers they play a pair of totally mixed strategies
f[z2=b]A+ [1 ¡ z2=b]R; [z1=b]A+ [1¡ z1=b]Rg. This kind of equilibrium takes place for the
values z1 2 (0;b), z2 2 (0;b) and ¼¤ 2 [¼(a;b);a) related in the following way:
(1¡ 2a ¡ 2b)z1z2 +(z1 +z2)ab
b2 = ¼
¤:
One can show that this type of equilibrium exists when ½(a;b) ¸ 1¡ 2b (see (13) for the
formulas of the function ½(:;:)), and ¼¤ is su¢ciently close to ½(a;b). From Figure 3 it can be
seen that this happens when, given any value of a; the value of b is su¢ciently high. Q.E.D.
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